Hegelianism and Christianity by Gerstner, John H., Jr.
Hegelianism and Christianity
John H. Gerstner, Jr.
John Oman has written : . . We
are waiting today for some change in
philosophy away from Helegianism
and the process of thought as the key
to the universe, corresponding to the
movement of science away from New-
tonianism, with its assumption of the
laws of motion as the efficient cause
of things."^ This statement reveals
two things : first, that Hegel is still
with us, and, second, that men who
think as Oman thinks wish he were
not.
Hegel's influence has been greatly
under-rated precisely because his own
claims were so greatly over-stated.
Xever in the history of thought did
any man profess such exhaustive
knowledge and practical omniscience.
F. L. Patton, that master of verbal
caricature, states it this way : "When
Zopliar the Naamathite put the ques
tion to his class, 'Who by searching
can find out God?' an Hegelian, amid
the silence of the school, courageously
held up his hand."^ Again : "Here, as
a witty writer suggests, is a catasti o-
phe the reverse of that of Korah; the
earth has not swallowed up the man,
but the man has swallowed up the
universe."-' Unfortunately, though
Hegel explained everything no one is
sure he can explain Hegel. It seems
that a student brought a passage to
Hegel for explanation and the philos
opher replied : "When that passage
was written, there were two who knew
its meaning�God and myself. Xow,
alas! there is but one, and that is
1 Naturalism and Supernaturalism, (Macmillan.
1931), pp. 107-108.
2 Fundamental Christianity, (Macmillan, 1926),
p. 38.
3 Harris. Samuel The Self-Revelation of God,
(Scribners, 1887), p. 260.
God."
There was one thing more surpris
ing than the stupendousness of Hegel's
claim and that was that his contempor
aries believed it! But they did, and
following a period of philosophical
inebriation came the morning after
and then the revulsion from which, it
seems, philosophers are still suttering.
When this revulsion set in, the phi
losophers not only threw out Hegel's
baby with Hegel's wash, but they
threw out Hegel too. And it is proving
veiy difticult for him to get back again.
Hence, we hear much disparagement
and little appreciation. Xevertheless,
though Hegel's name may be anath
ema, many of his ideas, as Oman sug
gests, have become sacred.
Let us comment briefly on the
Hegelianism of two of the world's
outstanding philosophers, A. N.
Whitehead and John iJewey. Op
posed as each of these men is to tiie
Absolute Idealism of Hegel, they
nevertheless show striking alfinity for
his fundamental viewpoint. The
German philosopher was most char
acteristically dissatisfied with any
thing lurking behind phenomena.
Thus, he refuted the substance theory
of Spinoza, the thing-in-itself of Kant
and the absolute of Schelling. As
Weber has stated : "In Hegel, the
absolute is the process itself; it does
not produce movement and life, it is
movement and life.""^ For Whitehead
and Dewey also process is reality. In
the former's Process and Reality
existence and the natural order are
ultimate, and God, if anything, ap
pears to be its product, certainly not
4 Weber and Perry, History of Philosophy,
(Scribners, 1925), p. 406.
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its producer. Dewey's Quest for Cer
tainty is significant here. He deplores
the philosophical endeavor to find
abiding ideas and prefers to believe
in the world as flux or process. Thus
Dewey finds uncertainty, and Hegel a
kind of certainty, but the important
thing is that they look in the same
place. All of these philosophers find
nothing behind phenomena.
Hegel's influence is by no means
restricted to philosophical circles.
Rather, as Dr. Brightman says :
It speaks well for the power of reason today that
Hegel is still an influence in the world of affairs.
No Hegel, no Marx-Engels-Lenin ; no commun
ism and no socialist critique of communist dogma.
No Hegel, no Nazi theory of the state and no
Liebert to indict it. No Hegel, no Gentile to or
ganize the Fascist system of education and no
Croce to defy Mussolini. It is from Hegel that
Royce received much of his inspiration ; from
Hegel that Dewey took bis start, and to Hegel
he still looks as the greatest of the systematic
philosophers. 5
Nevertheless, our concern in this
paper is with Hegel's significance in
the realm of religion. Himself always
an avowed Lutheran, Hegel's philos
ophy of Christianity was Janus-faced.
His identification of the content of
religion and of philosophy could be
evaluated diversely. If one is im
pressed with the rational bulwark thus
provided for religion, as is Hocking,
the effect is conservative. If one is
impressed with the complete rational
izing of religion, the effect is radical.
Ahnost immediately after Hegel the
theologians chose up sides, forming
themselves into right and left wing
Hegelians.
Among the conservatives. Daub and
especially Biedermann are examples.
Daub could write that the sig-nificance
of ( hiist was that he exhibited the
eternal incarnation of God and re
demption of the world in his own
pei'son as a historical fact. Thus he
S In Wieman, H. N., and B. E. Meland, Amer
ican Philfl'snphii's of Religion, (Willett, Clark &
Co., 1936), p. 319.
was the God-man in a unique sense.^
Biedermann supplemented Hegel by
teaching that religious faith was a
distinct element not to be equated
with or dissolved by reason. But this
faith presupposes revelation which it
discerns immediately. H. R. Mac
intosh in Types of Modern Philosophy
describes Biedermann as the philos-
oi^her "who meant to be as Hegelian
as possible, but always found Christ
ianity breaking in.'"'
The radical wing found in Feuer-
bach and Strauss their ablest and
most devastating exponents. Feuer-
bach reduced the absolute to man's
size and ultimately, as a materialist,
rejected all ideas including those of
God which he called "Wunchwesen"
or wishful thinking. In Strauss's
Leben Jesu, the pictures of Hegel have
become the "myths'" of Christianity.
In iilaiih^ nsleJirc, religion in general
seems to lose its savor. Finally
Strauss asks himself, "Are we still
Christians?" and answers: "If we
would have our yea yea and our nay
nay, in short, if we would speak as
honest, upright men, we must acknowl
edge that we are no longer Christ
ians."^ Pfleiderer points out Strauss'
significance in the histoiy of Hegel
ianism.
Two previous works upon Immortality, the au
thors of which are Richter and Feuerbach, were
reckoned among the Hegelian school, had indeed,
by the radical negative conclusions therein
reached by the application of this philosophy,
shaken the confidence generally felt in Hegelian
orthodoxy; but . . . produced no very important
effect. When, however, Strauss brouglit the
heavy artillery of his criticism, distinguished
equally by learning and penetration, to bear, first,
on the historical foundations of the dogma itself
the unsubstantial fabric of Hegelian dogmatism
was within a few years completely destroyed.9
6 Pfleiderer, Otto, The Development of Theol
ogy, (Macmillan, 1890), p. 132.
7 H. R. Macintosh, Types of Modern Philos-
ohpy. p. 133.
8 Quoted in Smith, H. B., Faith and Philosophy,
(Scribner, Armstrong & Co., 1877), p. 469.
9 The Development of Theology. (Macmillan,
1890), p. 132.
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In England Hegelianism prevailed
in a pure form at Oxford, but was
gradually watered down. In the class
room, Dr, Brightman once gave his
rating of some of the British thinkers
and this is the score if my notes do
not fail me: Bradley and Bosanquet,
100% Hegelian ; Pringle-Pattison,
60%; Sorley, 40%; Ward, 0%. Dr,
Ralph Barton Perry, rather more glee
ful than sad, has a similar story to
tell:
Thus the weakness of Hegel, from the later
idealistic point of view, lies not in his general
programme, but in the fact that he boldly set
about carrying it out. He made too many pos
itive assertions. The fact that Hegel did make
positive assertions about natural evolution, about
historical development, and about international
politics, accounts for the fact that his philosophy
was of vital consequence, and to many a source
of inspiration. But today no one is more ready
than the idealist to point out that Hegel made
the mistake of forcing 'psychological' categories
upon nature and history. He tried to deduce the
actual cosmic process from the laws of spirit;
and it is now generally conceded that he failed.
Everyone but the idealist explains his failure by
the falsity of the project itself; but he attributes
it to the fact that Hegel's categories of spin;
were not purely logicalA^
Josiah Royce, George H, Howison
and William E. Hocking stand as
American exponents of modified
Hegelianism. Royce turned his atten
tion especially to the problem of the
individual and evil, while Howison
objected that Royce had not allowed
sufficient place for the individual self
and contended for a plurality of
selves. The place of feeling in Objec
tive Idealism is a particular concern
of Hocking.
However, the most significant mod
ern role of Hegelian religion is as
thesis to Kierkegaard's antithesis.
Hegel's was the original "both-and"
against which Kierkegaard thrust his
"either-or." When Hegel was con
fronted with what appeared to be
contradictions he attempted, as we
10 Present Philosophical Tendencies, (Long
man's, Green & Co., 1925), p. 177.
shall see, to overcome them by his
famous dialectical method�thesis and
antithesis taken up into {aufgehohen)
a higher synthesis. Kierkegaard was
the policeman who, as soon as he saw
the philosophical machine begin to
grind its gears, blew his whistle,
"Stop !" He was the champion of the
unresolved contradiction. For Hegel
religion was whole thought; for Kier
kegaard it was shattered thought.
Hegel relied on rationality; Kierke
gaard cast himself upon the irrational.
Hegel deified the intellect ; Kierke
gaard crucified it. For Hegel religion
was a steady climb; for Kierkegaard
it was a frantic leap.^^
For all Kierkegaard's earnestness,
we doubt that he ever truly liberated
himself from rationalism. As John
Wild has pointed out.^^ Kierkegaard
asserts the good is unknowable and
paradoxical. But this is belied by
two things : first, he makes no appeal
to anything other than reason. Sec
ond, his three stages imply that man
naturally comes to a knowledge of the
good.
The spiritual seed of Kierkegaard,
Earth and Brunner, show the same
overt opposition to Hegel and the
"System." Earth's anathemas are in
no sense restricted to Hegel, since, as
be says, whatever is Christian is not
philosophical and whatever is philo
sophical is not Christian. His com
plete abhorrence of imnianentism and
utter devotion to the "absolutely
Other," is hostile indeed to Hegel's
God, who is in a very entangling
alliance with this woild and is the
absolutely-not-Other,"
Erunner's opposition to Hegel is
rather more reasoned, which fact ac
counts for Earth's distrust of it.
Fii'st, Brunner estimates Hegel's in
fluence :
11 Cf. esp. Philosophical Fragments, and Con
cluding Scientific Postscript.
12 "Philosophical Review," Vol. XLIX, No. 5,
Sept. 1940, p. 544.
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Since the time of Herder, Hegel, and Schleier-
macher this scheme of a universal spiritual evo
lution, including also the Christian religion, has
become a sort of scientific axiom which anyone
who claims to be systematic must simply accept.
This thesis of idealism has been rendered un
objectionable to theology by the circumstance
that the conception of the individuality of
religions seemed to give due place to the peculiar
character of the Christian faith.l3
Then, he criticizes Hegel's position
fundamentally: "The decisive differ
ence, therefore, consists in the fact
that, for the idealist, the self-disclos
ure [of God] is fundamentally imme
diate, whereas for the Christian faith
it is fundamentally mediated."^"^
We pass now from a consideration
of Hegel's influence to date, back to
Hegel himself and especially his
philosophy of religion. The Alpha and
the Omega of Hegel's system is the
inclusiveness of the Absolute. Conse
quently his most frequently quoted
statement, "Das Wahre ist das Gauze"
is eminently characteristic of his
thought. Being and all other categor
ies are to be regarded as constituting
the Absolute. In the Science of
Logic, this view is set forth as the only
adequate one, all other ones being
inherently defective. Hegel's use of
the term "Inbegriff" is significant.
The "Inbegriff aller realitat" is the
sum total of all reality and the all-
inclusive Begriff or concept. It is not
only a sum but a new entity, the whole
being more than the sum of its parts.^''
Hegel's universal is no mere abstrac
tion, because an abstraction is drawn
off from and excludes reality; but
Hegel's universal is concrete, includ
ing reality. Bosanquet devotes Lec
ture II of his Principle of Individual-
it if and Value to the explication of this
concept.
Because of the all-inclusive charac-
13 Brunner, Emil, Philosophy of Religion, trans.
by Farrer & Woolf, (Scribners, 1937), p. 128.
I* Ibid., p. 40.
Encyclopaedic, �75.
16 Vol. n, p. 456.
^7 Ibid., p. 343.
ter of the Absolute, Hegelians hesitate
to use the word "person." F. H. Brad
ley, for example, uses the designation
super-personal. Adherents of the Per-
sonalist School may regard Hegel's
Absolute as including not one, but
many persons, and feel that the Hegel
ian super-person though he may be
more than, is not other than person.
It is interesting to note, in passing,
that C. S. Lewis thinks of God as
"beyond personality" and that Calvin
himself was almost tried for heresy
because he did not like the term
"persona" as descriptive of deity.
However, any similarity between the
latter's and Hegel's view of the Ab
solute are purely coincidental.
Since the Absolute includes all
things, it follows that all things re
veal the Absolute. Since all things are
revelations of the Absolute, the Ab
solute can be known. Since all things
constitute the Absolute and there is
nothing more, the Absolute may be
absolutely known. Hegel, in other
words, is champion of the knowability
of the Absolute and opponent of even
partial inscrutability. This is not
merely the logical conclusion of the
/'henonieiiologg and Science of Logic,
but the prelude to hiw Philosophy^ of
Religion.
Let us observe this further before
commenting. The Absolute unfolds
itselt in the realm of concepts (cf.
Science of Logic and in the realm of
nature (cf. Encyclopedia, ��245 ff.)
but onlv in the realm of mind, or
spirit does the Absolute come to con
sciousness and freedom (cf. Encnfclo-
pedia, ��482ff.; esp. 553ff.).
The Absolute unfolds itself in triadic
form also in the realm of spirit; first
in art, then in religion, and supremely
in philosophy. In art it appears in the
form of sense objects which, although
necessary for art, are an impediment
to a purely rational perception by
spirit. A more refined manifestation
is found in the representations (Vor-
stellungen) of religion which are
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picture-tlioughts partaking of tlie sen
suous because they are pictures and of
tlie rational because they are thoughts.
In philosophy the Absolute is seen
immediately as pure thought.
This brings us to grii)s with Hegel's
doctrine of revelation. Manifestly, his
gnosticism was a great improvement
over the agnosticism of Kant and
Schelling. AV^e agree with jMaier in his
Hegel's Criticism of Kant in which he
shows that Hegel exposed the absurd
ity of Kant's talking about an object
which could not be brought in relation
to our consciousness. Kant's myster
ious underlying reality, having no
known qualities nt all, could not be
anvthing other than mind itself. This
Hegel argued and then proceeded to
conceive of mind as all that has being
and thereby made reality knowable by
itself. Likewise, he indicates the
futility of Sclielling's undifferentiated
Absolute, the hidden reality that in
cludes everything but in such abyssmal
darkness that nothing can be seen,
"the night in which all cows are
black." ^lure has pointed out that in
his intellectual optimism, Hegel is re
verting to the Greeks and away from
Kant's revolution by which, as Perry
says, the latter succeeded in "internal
izing reason." Hegel thought of Plato
and Aristotle as fundamentally the
same and with them agreed that what
is most real is eo ipso, that which is
most intelligible. The philosopher's
task, as Hegel saw it, was to prove
this.
In this respect, we need Hegel today.
To the liberals who despair of all cer
tainty and are profoundly skeptical of
the demonstrableuess of truth he
would say, "In the mental or spiritual
there is now an infinite . . . capable of
being communicated,"^* or, "the humil
ity which affirms that the finite cannot
know (lod nor come into direct rela
tion to him, simply ascribes to God
p. 355.
powerlessness to make himself
known. "^^ To the neo-orthodox, not
resigned to but revelling in the irra
tional, he would say: "Things do not
agree with ideas because you are on a
level of thought where you cannot
take all things into account. And
to the positivists and other secularists
of our day, he would say : "What
knowledge is v/ortli knowing if God be
unknowable ?"^^
There are two serious defects in
Hegel's teaching concerning revelation.
He makes too little of the apparatus
for receiving the revelation and too
much of general revelation itself. Even
Pfleiderer admits that Hegel's sole
reliance on thought as the recipient of
the revelation is unwarranted. "Reli
gion is essentially a matter of the
heart. "^^ This criticism has been so
generally made that it has become a
cliche to classify Hegel as one who
exaggerated the intellectual element
in religion, alongside Kant who did
the same with the volitional element
and Schliermacher with the emotional.
need not elaborate.
While it is conceded that Hegel
made too little of the apparatus for
receiving revelation, it has not been
especially noted that he made too
19 Philosophie d.er Religion, Vol. 1, p. 195,
quoted in Harris, Self-Revelation of God, p. 91.
20 Science of Logic, Vol. H, p. 397.
21 Philosophie der Religion, Vol. I, p. 27.
22 Development of Theology, p. 73. Cf . Strong,
Systematic Theology, p. 120. "Religion is not, as
Hegel declared, a kind of knowing for it would
then be only an incomplete form of knowledge,
and the measure of knowledge in such case would
be the measure of piety. . . . God is the subject
of religion as well as its object. Religion is God's
knowing of himself through the human con
sciousness. Hegel did not utterly ignore other
elements in religion. 'Feeling, intuition, and
faith belong to it,' he says, 'and mere cognition
is one-sided.' . . . 'what knowledge is worth
knowing, if God is unknowable.' ... he gave even
less place to the will than he gave to the emotions
and he failed to see that the knowledge of God
of which the Scripture speaks is a knowing, not
of the intellect alone, but of the \vhole man."
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much of general revelation. It would
appear obvious that Hegel has oblit
erated the distinction between general
and special revelation. If all things
reveal the Absolute, because they are
the Absolute, there can be no such
thing as special revelation. What con
fuses the matter is that Hegel refers
to Christianity as absolute religion
and calls it "revealed."'^ Dr. Strong is
correct when he states that: "Hegel,
in his Philosophy of Religion, says
that Christianity is the only revealed
religion, because the Christian God is
the only one from whom a revelation
can come."^'^ Nevertheless, it should
be noted that this is quibbling with
terminology. True, Hegel believed
that the Christian conception of God
was the only adequate, viz., absolute,
one. And only the Absolute could re
veal the Absolute. And so the Chris
tian God is the only one from whom
revelation could come. But that is not
the equivalent of saying that Chris
tians were the only ones to whom it
came or Christianity the only religion
in ii hich it came, which is the historic
teaching of the Church.
The writer was once asked to
demonstrate the fact that the church
has maintained the views here in
dicated of special revelation. We
referred the questioner to Schaff's
three volume Creeds of Christendom
where anyone who runs may yet read
that the churches have uniformly tes
tified to a unique once-for-all revela
tion in no sense to be confused with
that natural revelation which is called
"common" precisely because it is
universal and at all times present.
Let me give but one citation at ran
dom. In the Westminster Confession
of Faith, for example, we read :
Although the light of nature, and the works of
creation and providence, do so far manifest the
goodness, wisdom, and power of God, as to
leave men inexcusable; yet they are not sufficient
2i Philosophy of Religion. Vol. II, pp. 329-330.
24 Systematic Theology, p. 27.
to give that knowledge of God and of his will,
which is necessary unto salvation; therefore it
pleased the Lord ... to reveal himself, and to
declare ... his will unto his Church.
In orthodox thinking special revela
tion is unique, once for all revelation.
It occurred at one time and one place
and to one people and is no general
world phenomenon at all. The late Dr.
Machen, who is regarded by Wieman
and Meland,^^ as the outstanding rep
resentative of traditional supernatur
alism, stresses the strict historicalness
of Christianity:
Christianity depends, not upon a complex of ideas,
but upon the narration of an event. Without that
event, the world, in the Christian view, is al
together dark, and humanity is lost under sin.
There can be no salvation by the discovering of
eternal truth. ... A new face has been put upon
life by the blessed thing that God did when he
offered up His only begotten Son.26
Brunner also, one of the ablest expon
ents of neo-supernaturalism, sees
through the spuriousness of Hegel's
"special revelation," contrasting it
with the Christian view:
To him the idealist history is merely a picture-
book, whose text he knows without the aid of
pictures ; to him it means the idea made concrete,
hence there is nothing decisive about it. In its
absolute and serious sense, there is no room here
for the category of uniqueness. . . . Hegel seemed
able to absorb history into thought as Plotinus
and Schelling did with Nature.27
Oman, likewise, is not deceived:
Though Hegel's idea that in history we see in the
furnace what is now built into life as cold and
commonplace, was a great contribution to the
whole method of studying history, in the end real
history has no place in his intellectual construc
tion. What masquerades as history is a show
staged by dialectic, not history as a record of
man's slow, laborious, often mistaken, constantly
discouraged, learning from experience by the
real hazard of dealing with environment.28
We return to Hegel's exposition. On
2i American Philosophies of Religion, p. 62.
26 Christianity and Liberalism, p. 70.
27 The Mediator, trans, by Olive Wyon, (Lut
terworth Press, 1934), pp. 36-37.
'2^ Naturalism and Supernaturalism, (Macmil
lan, 1931), p. 291.
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the level of religion, the dialectic, of
course, moves through three stages.
The thetic stage is that of the univer
sal. God is the universal mind. When
this universal mind, which cannot
remain in this splendid isolation, sun
ders itself into particularity the anti
thetic stage is reached. This moment
corresponds to the various positive
religions. As a result of the union of
the universal and particular moments
the synthesis is achieved and we have
what corresponds to the absolute
religion.
In Christianity, with which we are
primarily concerned, God is concrete
spirit the first moment of which is
God as He is before creation, the
second is God in creation, and the
third is God in the Church. In the
first, God, as the universal in itself, is
the Father. In the second, God, as
particular, is the Son. In the third,
God, as individual, is the Holy
Spirit.29
The pure heresy of such a view of
the doctrine of the trinity is self-
evident to anyone versed in the Bib
lical doctrine. Rather than submit my
own criticism I will cite McTaggart
whose testimony on this point
is especially significant insofar as
his concern in comparing Hegelian
Trinitarianism and Christian Trin-
itarianism is purely academic, since
apparently he is not devoted to either
conception himself. As something of
a neutral observer, he regards Hegel's
Trinitarianism as missing the mark of
ecclesiastical Trinitarianism.
According to Hegel's exposition, the Father
and the Son are the Thesis and Antithesis of a
triad of which the Holy Ghost is the Synthesis.
It will follow from this that the Holy Ghost is
the sole reality of the Trinity. Insofar as the
Father and the Son are real, they are taken as
correlative with the Holy Ghost, and as on the
same level with the latter, they are taken wrongly
and are not real. In other words, the Father and
the Son are simply abstractions which the thinker
29 Cf. Hegel, Philosdphy of Religion, Vol. Ill,
pp. 1,2.
makes from the concrete reality of the Holy
Ghost.
This may be the correct doctrine of the Trin
ity, but it is not the usual one. It must be noticed
that it does not merely place the Holy Ghost
above the other two members of the Trinity,
but merges these latter in the Holy Ghost, which
is therefore not only the supreme reality, but
the sole reality God. And, again, the doctrine is
more than the assertion that the relation of the
members of the Trinity is not merely external.
Doubtless it is not merely external, but internal
and essential. But the point is as to the particular
sort of relation. The Father and the Son are
related to the Holy Ghost as something which
is they, and more than they. But the Holy Ghost
is related to the Father and the Son�if it is to
be called a relation�in a very different manner.
Each of them, so far as it is real at all, is the
Holy Ghost. But each of them is less than the
Holy Ghost. And so are both of them taken
together.30
McTaggart might have said that
Hegel's doctrine was the procession of
the Father and the Son from the Holy
Spirit. Mackintosh does say : "This is
certainly a piece of heterodoxy ;
possibly an inversion of Church teach-
ing."^^
We have dealt with "God in His
eternal Idea in-and-for-self ; the King
dom of the Father." This phase of
Christian revelation Hegel associated
with the First member of the Trinity
and reserved for consideration the
other two members under the titles :
''The eternal Idea of God in the
element of consciousness and ordinary
thought, or difference; the kingdom of
the Son;" and "The Idea in the
element of the Church or Spiritual
(Community ; the kingdom of the
Spirit." It is with the latter two
divisions of the discussion that we are
now concerned.
Much in the manner of John's
statement that "no man hath seen God
at any time; the only begotten Son,
who is in the bosom of the Father, he
hath declared him" ; Hegel says : "this
Idea is now to be considered as it
^0 Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, (University
Press, 1901), pp. 203, 204.
31 Hegel and Hegelianism, (T. & T. Clark,
1903), p. 259.
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appears in the second element, in the
element of manifestation in general."^^
\Vhat was latent in the universal,
namely differentiation, now becomes
patent in the particular. Before, dif
ferentiation was "merely a movement,
a playing of love with itself, in which
it does not get to be otherness or
Other-Being in any serious sense,
nor actually reach a condition of
separation and division.^^ Now, dif-
derentiation has become entire other
ness: external, independent, alienated,
diiierent. Nevertheless, we are re
minded that the separation or differ
entiation is still not yet complete.
"What we have here is merely abstract
difference in general, we have not yet
got to ditference in the form which
peculiarly belongs to it."'''^
The Notion, which we have already
seen consists of three moments, now
passes into nature. "The absolute
freedom of the Idea means that in
determining itself, in the act of judg
ment, or ditferentiation, it grants the
iree independent existence of the
Other. This Other, as something thus
allowed to have an independent exist
ence, is represented by the AVorld
taken in a general sense."^^ This
transition is one of logical necessity
and is not to be confused with a tem-
l)oral order although the term creation
is used. Setli maintains that Hegel
does not bridge the gap here between
the logically necessary and the tem
porally generated otherness. And
alienation is the result of otherness.
Xevei'theless, alienation is not fully
manifested until nmn appears, for, as
I'tleiderer remarks,
. . . the difference is not fully developed in
nature, which remains true to its own essence and
character, faithfully obeys its own laws, and does
not step outside of the substance, the necessity of
its being. Man, on the contrary, is called to be
Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Vol.
Ill, p. 34.
33 Ibid., p. 35.
34 Ibid., p. 35.
35 Ibid., p. 36.
or rather to become what he is essentially; it be
longs to the notion of him that he should place
himself over-against his nature, his present state,
and enter into the division between his essence
and his actual state. And his consciousness is it
self the act by which this division is set up, for
consciousness is the distinguishing of him, this
particular subject, from himself, his universal
being.36
Thus Hegel has a doctrine of the
fall but it is not the fall of man but
the fall of God. That is to say, God
by becoming finite or other, alienates
Himself from Himself. This differ
entiated and finite self Hegel speaks
of as man and thinks of him by virtue
of his finitude and otherness as fallen,
as evil.
Man is by nature evil ; his potential Being, his
natural Being, is evil. It is just in this his con
dition as one of natural Being that his defect is
found ; because he is Spirit he is separated from
his natural Being, and is disunion. One-sidedness
is directly involved in this natural condition.
VvIkh man is only as he is according to Nature,
he is evil. 37
It would appear that "man" was born
falhm. I'^vil is not something alien to
his nature but of the essence. He was
born in sin and in iniquity did his God
conceive him. Because he was a free,
independent, particulai- being, he was
a fallen being. It was not because he
misused his freedom but because he
used it ; not because he violated his
nature but because he expressed it,
that he was a fallen creature. When
Hegel's God rested from His creative
activity He saw everything that he
had made, including man, and, behold,
it was very bad.
This account of the Hegelian con
ception of evil is thus far one-sided
and inadequate. First of all, Hegel
conceives of an original state of
naturalness, a somewhat non-moral
state; and secondly, man even in his
fallen state is, in a sense, good as well
as evil. This is what provokes William
James' protest that Hegel "encour-
36 The Philosophy of Religion, Vol. II, p. 105.
37 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Vol.
Ill, pp. 47, 48.
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aged men to see the world good rather
than to make it good."
This doctrine of evil proceeding
from the Absolute Spirit implies that
God himself includes evil. We have
here the reverse of Christian Science
reasoning. Mrs. Eddy argues: God is
all, God is good, therefore, all is good.
Hegel argues : God is all, all includes
evil, therefore, God is evil. Of course,
this conclusion is a logical one on
a pantheistic presupposition. If the
Absolute is all-inclusive, as Hegel be
lieved, it must include evil. Consist
ent as the conclusion may be, it is, as
Mill believed, the reduction ah-
surdissimum/'
To say that man is by nature good
amounts substantially to saying that
he is potentially Spirit, rationality,
that he has been created in the image
of God; God is the Good, and Man as
Spirit is the reflection of God, he is
the Good potentially.^^ With this qual
ification in mind, we may state again
that nmn although good in one regard,
yet is alienated from God by nature.
This condition of separation, however,
sets up a longing, a feeling in which
a tendency to reunion is generated.
"In this division independence is set
up, and evil has its seat ; here is the
source of evil, but also the point from
which atonement ultimately arises. It
is both the beginning of sickness and
the source of health.'*�
Separation produces sin and sin a
desire for reconciliation. As the prod
igal son became dissatisfied with his
loneliness and his swine's fare and
longed for the father's house where
there was plenty and to spare, so the
particular in the state of separation
requires reunion with the universal.
38 Cf. Evcyclopaedie. �573; Mansel, Limits of
Rclig'.ous Thought, 3rd Edition, p, 46; and
Brightman, The Problem of God, (Abingdon
Press, 1930), p. 83.
39 Hegel, Lectures on Philosophy of Religion,
Vol. ni, p. 46.
40 Pfleiderer, The Philosophy of Religion, Vol.
n. p. 106.
This desire is the tendency toward
reconciliation which is as much in the
nature of things as is the separation.
Finite minds are restless till they find
rest in the infinite mind. This recon
ciliation is realized when the infinite
assumes finiteness. This logically
necessary, eternally recurr-ing move
ment of the infinite to the finite finds
doctrinal expression in the Incarna
tion and Death of Jesus Christ.
It is a proof of infinite love that God identified
Himself with what was foreign to His nature
in order to slay it. This is tiie signification of the
death of Christ. Christ has borne the sins of the
world. He has reconciled God to us, as it is
said.4i
The movement back from the finite
to the infinite is expressed doctrinally
in the Resurrection and in the Ascen
sion of Christ. God assumes finite
nature even to the extreme point of the
death of the infinite. This death, how
ever, is swallowed up in infinity as
God rises from death and ascends
again. "This death is thus at once
finitude and in its most extreme form,
and at the same time the abolition and
absoiption of the natural finitude."'*^
By His Ascension to the right hand of
God, Christ, says Hegel, demonstrates
the dignity, worth, and identity of
human nature with that of the divine
nature.
We have arrived at the stage where
the re-union has been effected. God
and Man are one again. They had
been one from the beginning but their
diversity had been implicit. Now, after
having affirmed most emphatically.
and even tragically, their diversity
they re-affirm their unity, not in spite
of diversity but because of it.
The Spirit of God is in ]\lan but not
in the individual man. Rather His
presence is where two or more are
gathered together in the Community
or Church. On the disciples the Holy
41 Hegel, Lectures oit the Philosophy of Re
ligion, Vol. Ill, p. 93.
42/^7td., p. 93.
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Ghost descended at Pentecost and be
came their immanent life. Real and
present life in the Spirit of Christ,
that is Hegel's definition of the
Church.
In the Spiritual Community as actually existing,
the Church is emphatically the institution in
virtue of which the persons composing it reach
the truth end appropriate it for themselves, and
through it the Holy Spirit comes to be in them as
real, actual, and present, and has its abode in
them; it means that the truth is in them, and
that they are in a condition to enjoy and give
active expression to the truth or Spirit, that they
as individuals are those who give active expres
sion to the Spirit.43
For Hegel, the Church is a "think
ing as well as loving and practical
communion. It thinks the contents of
the gospel narratives and of the Chris
tian sentiment in the form of the
Faith,"'^'^ Hegel's anti-Pietism is never
seen more clearly or more usefully at
work than in his insistence that
"dogma is necessary, and must be
taught as valid truth." It is not suffi
cient that the Community feel, it must
also think. When the Son of Man
comes again, will He find knowledge?
Hegel asks.
Proper appreciation of the import
ance of the sacraments is evident to
Hegel. If he was not a Romanist,
neither was he a sectarian.
The Eucharist is the central point of the doctrine
of Christianity, and the highest act of worship.
While, on the one hand, the constant preservation
of the Church ... is the continued repetition of
the life, passion, and resurrection of Christ in
the members of the Church, this, on the other
hand, is expressly accomplished in the sacra
ments of the Lord's Supper.
Thus he holds the Lutheran rather
than the Catholic or Zwinglian view.
We will ask one final question of
this Hegelian exposition of Christian
ity. HoA\' does it compare with the
^Ubid., p. 124.
44 Sterrett, J. MacBride, Studies in Hegel's
Philosophy of Religion, p. 297.
Church's exposition as embodied in
the historic Church creeds? In spite
of many points of some similarity be
tween the Christian and Hegelian doc
trine, I fear that the differences are
fundamental and radical. Hegel may
be correct but I doubt if it can be
maintained with any seriousness that
he is orthodox. His view of revelation
we have already sufficiently criticized.
Certainly his conception of the Trinity
is not that of the Church which be
lieves in a single substantial identity,
God, in which single substance there
are three Persons. The Hegelian Trin
ity is at most a ghost of this. In the
Hegelian deity the world is implicit,
or at least the idea of an other is
implicit. The Church would question
first whether this otherness is a con
crete world at all; second, it would
deny that if it were a world it emanat
ed necessarily from the nature of God;
and, third, the Church affirms that
this "other" is not the world but the
Soil of God.
Again, according to the church, God
saw His world that is was good, not
evil. Hegel's identification of finitude
and evil is a distinctly pagan concep
tion that, so far as I know, has never
found expression in a creed of any
orthodox Christian Church. Hegel's
insistence that the world, including
man, is in a sense good does not offset
the radicalness of his departure from
the church at this point.
Lastly, if the Church and the Bible
be not in error then Christ came into
the Avorld to save sinners and not to
merge finitude in the infinite. Since
Hegel's conception of sin is different
from that of the Church, it follows
that his notion of grace and associated
doctrines must be diverge, Christ
came not to call the finite to repent
ance but sinners; not to preach a
metaplwsical reconciliation but an
ethical one; not to make man into
God, but like unto God,
